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The Supreme Court of the United States has assured prisoners that
"[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of
this country."' According to the Court, .'a prisoner is not wholly stripped of
constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime."' The rather
broad language used by the Court in its discussions of prisoners' constitu-
tional rights, combined with a number of decisions defining the scope of
those rights, once apparently indicated that the Court was willing to lend a
sympathetic ear to prisoners with constitutional grievances.' Lower federal
courts interpreted the Supreme Court's language and decisions as a mandate
for general constitutional review of prison conditions, regulations, and prac-
tices.4 But a review of the Court's most recent prisoners' rights decisions, as
well as a reappraisal of its earlier opinions, reveals that the Court does not
analyze the merits of prisoners' constitutional complaints consistently with
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia Law School.
1. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
2. Id. at 555. See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); and Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 45 U.S.L.W. 4820, 4825 (U.S. June 23, 1977)
(Burger, J., concurring).
3. This article discusses the Supreme Court's attitude toward the constitutional
rights of prisoners only with respect to the conditions of confinement. It does not discuss
Court opinions pertaining to the procedural due process rights of individuals during a sen-
tencing hearing (e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. 605 (1967); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)), or to pretrial detainment
of mentally incompetent criminal defendants (e.g., McNeil v. Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S.
245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107
(1966)), or to conditions under which defendants are detained pending trial (e.g., Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956)).
4. For examples of lower court decisions that have protected the constitutional
rights of prisoners, see Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir.
1974); United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Farmer v. Loving,
392 F. Supp. 27 (W.D. Va. 1975); Walker v. Hughes, 386 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Mich.
1974); Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974); and James v. Wallace,
382 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
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its statement that prisoners possess constitutional rights. While reiterating
the principle that the Constitution protects prisoners, the Court has given the
principle little substance. Its resolution of constitutional issues raised by
prisoners usually entails extreme deference to the decisions of the prison
officials accused of violating the constitutional rights of inmates. Through
such deference, -the Court has achieved a result that it could much more
easily and candidly have achieved had it simply declared that prisoners are
not entitled to constitutional protection. The Court has continued to profess,
however, that the Constitution does protect prisoners, and under cover of
that assertion, has permitted a hardy weed, the "hands-off" 5 approach, to
creep back into the prison yard from which it ostensibly had been banished.
This article describes the current status of prisoners' constitutional
rights according to the practice and theory of the Supreme Court. The
conclusion drawn from that description is that the Court's analytical method
in resolving prisoners' rights cases is inconsistent with its own stated propos-
ition that the Constitution protects prisoners. In fact, the analytical method
employed by the Court in past prisoners' rights decisions leaves prison
inmates largely at the mercy of prison officials. A realistic appraisal of the
Court's approach to the prisoners' rights issue indicates that the Court either
should minimize the deference now given to prison officials or should ac-
knowledge candidly that the Constitution is inapplicable to prisoners and
then justify that position.
I. The Historical Setting
Not long ago the Supreme Court appeared to break with a judicial
tradition that utilized a "hands-off" doctrine as a complete bar to considera-
tion of the merits of prisoner complaints alleging a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights. The hands-off approach was founded on the assumption that
judicial review of administrative decisions of prison officials would subvert
prison discipline and the efforts of prison administrators to accomplish
penological objectives. Because the doctrine operated as a jurisdictional bar
to prisoners' complaints, it enabled federal courts to avoid any constitutional
review of prison administrative decisions.6 In effect, this hands-off doctrine
5. See text accompanying note 6 infra.
6. For a good description of the basis for and effect of the hands-off principle, see
Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Com-
plaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). See also Hirschkop & Millemann, The
Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795 (1969). Justices Brennan and
Marshall note the emergence of a new variety of the hands-off doctrine with dismay in




operated in the same fashion as would a straightforward judicial declaration
that prisoners have no constitutional rights.'
The Supreme Court first indicated in 1964 that it might subject prison
administrative decisions to the constraints of the Constitution. That year, in
Cooper v. Pate,' the Court appeared to discard the hands-off principle. It
reversed a federal district court's dismissal of a complaint alleging that
prison officials had denied an inmate the right to purchase certain religious
materials. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal, based
on the then traditional idea that federal courts have no business supervising
prison officials. 9 In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court cited two
opinions of the Second and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals,1" both of
which had refused to accept an argument that prisoner complaints raising
First Amendment issues should be dismissed. The Court appeared to ap-
prove of the refusal of the appellate courts to heed the admonition that it is
not the business of the federal judiciary to supervise prisons.
In the seven years following Cooper, the Supreme Court rendered few
opinions pertaining to the constitutional rights of prisoners, and in only two
of these did the Court address itself to the merits of the complaints. In Lee v.
Washington," the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids racial
segregation in state prisons. In Johnson v. Avery,12 the Court held that a
prison regulation forbidding inmates "to assist one another in the preparation
7. During the years in which this doctrine enjoyed prominence in the federal courts,
the Supreme Court rendered only four decisions that might be characterized as giving con-
sideration to the issue of prisoners' rights. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948) (appel-
late court allowed to decide whether or not to permit an inmate to argue his own case on
appeal); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942) (obstruction of an inmate's appeal from
a criminal conviction held to violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (prison officials not allowed to require
inmates to submit their petitions for writs of habeas corpus for preliminary institutional
review and approval); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919) (seizure of an inmate's
correspondence, with due process, held not to violate the guarantees of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments). Stroud reviewed the constitutionality of an administrative decision,
but only when the issue was raised in the course of an administrative proceeding. The
other three cases simply reviewed institutional restrictions in the course either of a habeas
corpus proceeding or of a direct appeal from a criminal conviction. In none of these cases
did the Court indicate that it would discard the hands-off approach and entertain inmates'
civil rights suits against allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
8. 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
9. See Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1963) (citing Stroud v. Swope,
187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951) for the proposition that federal courts have no pro-
per role in supervising prisons).
10. Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291
F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
11. 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
12. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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of lawsuits was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court in the latter case
simply protected the right of prison inmates to seek judicial redress for their
grievances. It did not say anything about the constitutional merits of griev-
ances regarding prison conditions. In Lee, the Court did not hold unconstitu-
tional a condition related solely to incarceration; it simply said that it would
give constitutional review to such conditions. The Court was careful to note
that if integration were to result in problems for the institution, the Court
would make "allowance for the necessities of prison security and discip-
line."' 3 Thus, although both decisions represented an abandonment of the
hands-off approach to judicial review of prisoner complaints, neither
Johnson nor Lee indicated that the Court would routinely review prison
administrative decisions that might interfere with prisoners' constitutional
rights. "
It was not until 1973, in Wolffv. McDonnell, 5 that the Supreme Court
considered the merits of a prisoner's constitutional challenge to an adminis-
trative decision affecting prison conditions and discipline. The Court stated
that "a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he
is imprisoned for crime."6 Because of the breadth and nature of the restric-
tions the Court imposed on prison disciplinary proceedings in Wolff, it
appeared that the Court was then ready to interfere substantially with prison
conditions in order to protect inmates' constitutional rights.
II. The Supreme Court's Current Approach
to Prisoners' Rights
Despite the general language of and hopes fostered by the Wolff deci-
sion,"7 the Supreme Court in Wolff can be said to have extended only
13. 390 U.S. at 334.
14. Other decisions after'Cooper that did not dispose of cases on the merits were
similarly limited in scope. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (prisoner
entitled to an opportunity to introduce evidence corroborating his allegation that prison
disciplinary procedures are unconstitutional); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249
(1971) (lower court should not have dismissed a challenge to prison disciplinary proce-
dures because that challenge was improperly labelled as a petition for writ of habeas cor-
pus); Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59 (1971) (lower court must consider the merits of a pris-
oner's complaint alleging infringement of First Amendment freedoms); Younger v. Gil-
more, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (affirming decision finding an unconstitutional interference by
prison officials with an inmate's access to legal materials); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S.
639 (1968) (inmate alleging a violation of his constitutional rights need not exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies before lodging a civil rights suit in federal district court). Younger
and Houghton merely re-emphasize the Court's willingness to protect an inmate's access
to federal courts; Haines, Cruz, and Wilwording say federal courts should protect the con-
stitutional rights of inmates but fail to analyze the extent of those rights vis-a-vis adminis-
trative strictures placed on those rights by prison officials.
15. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
16. Id. at 555.
17. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2538 (1976); Wolff v. McDon-
nell, 418 U.S. 539, 555, 556 (1974).
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minimal protection to prisoners under the United States Constitution. Al-
though the Court no longer defers absolutely to prison officials and govern-
ment interests in order to avoid subversion of prison authority or discipline,
it still defers to them significantly. The net effect of such deference is that
the Court has merely transported the concerns that fostered the development
of the hands-off doctrine from a focus on jurisdiction to a debate on the
merits of prisoners' constitutional claims. Mr. Justice Powell's opinion,
written for the majority of the Court inProcunier v. Martinez, 8 exemplifies
this process:
Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude
toward problems of prison administration. In part this policy is the pro-
duct of various limitations on the scope of federal review of conditions in
state penal institutions. More fundamentally, this attitude springs from
complementary perceptions about the nature of the problems and efficacy
of judicial intervention. Prison administrators are responsible for main-
taining internal order and discipline, for securing their institutions
against unauthorized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the ex-
tent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates
placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of
these duties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that
the problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and,
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by de-
cree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commit-
ment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the
legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those rea-
sons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent prob-
lems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact
reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state
penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for
deference to the appropriate prison authorities. 9
These words do not preface a dismissal of a prisoner's constitutional com-
plaint; rather they precede a discussion of what should be done to resolve the
merits of the complaint. They are a forceful reminder that, although the
Supreme Court may have been persuaded to abandon some barriers to pris-
oner complaints,20 the Court has yet to abandon a general deference to
prison officials.
18. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
19. Id. at 404-05. See also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 45 U.S.L.W.
4820, 4822 (U.S. June 23, 1977).
20. The Court has retreated slightly in its removal of jurisdictional barriers. In
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Court decided that whenever a prisoner
raises a constitutional claim necessitating relief that will alter either the fact or the dura-
tion of his confinement, the prisoner must assert his constitutional claim in a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. He may not raise his constitutional challenge in a civil rights suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Prior to Preiser, it had been assumed that prisoners
could challenge allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement under § 1983, even
if the result of the challenge would be early release for the prisoner. Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. at 500-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By demanding a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in certain situations instead of permitting suit under section 1983, the Court
in effect requires prisoners to give state courts the first chance to resolve constitutional
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It is not surprising that the Supreme Court continues to defer to prison
officials' assessment of their institution's own interests; some weight should
properly be given to interests asserted by the state. What is surprising is the
extent of the deference that the Court accords the viewpoint of prison ad-
ministrators, even when a prisoner asserts a "preferred" right, such as a
right protected by the First Amendment. With few exception this extreme
deference to government officials and their interests pervades every recent
Supreme Court opinion evaluating the merits of requests by prisoners for
protection of constitutional rights.2" It manifests itself in the types of con-
issues. The federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), permits a federal
court to consider habeas corpus claims only after state courts have done so, but federal
courts need not defer to state or administrative tribunals when suit is brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, for that section contains no statutory requirement that a prisoner
exhaust state remedies before proceeding in federal court.
In Burrell v. McCray, 96 S. Ct. 2640 (1976), the Supreme Court had an excellent
opportunity to impose a procedural rule of deference on suits under § 1983, and some of
the language used in Preiser seemed to be persuasive authority for requiring exhaustion of
state administrative remedies before prisoners would be allowed to bring suit under that
statute. The Court declined, however, to impose such a rule and dismissed, as improvi-
dently granted, a petition for writ of certiorari that raised the issue. Deference to the state
judiciary in habeas corpus suits remains the key procedural restriction on direct prisoner
access to federal courts for adjudication of constitutional claims.
Direct restrictions on access to the federal courts will not be discussed here. In the
first place, those restrictions are relatively insignificant when compared to the limitations
on successful litigation imposed by the Court's constitutional interpretation in prisoners'
suits. In addition, numerous constitutional challenges do not pertain to the fact or duration
of confinement and are, therefore, not covered by the Preiser opinion. Even those that do
affect the fact or duration of confinement may be raised in a § 1983 suit that asks only for
limited declaratory and monetary relief. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973).
See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
The underlying rationale of the Preiser opinion, however, as opposed to its precise
holding, should not be overlooked. Although the Court partially justified the holding in
Preiser by its interpretation of the language and intent of the federal habeas corpus stat-
ute, it also relied on principles of comity. The Court noted: "It is difficult to imagine an
activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up
with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administrz'ion of its prisons ...
Since these internal problems of state prisons involve issues so peculiarly within state au-
thority and expertise, the States have an important interest in not being bypassed in the
correction of those problems. Moreover, because most potential litigation involving state
prisoners arises on a day-to-day basis, it is most efficiently and properly handled by the
state administrative bodies and state courts, which are, for the most part, familiar with the
grievances of state prisoners and in a better physical and practical position to deal with
those grievances." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973). See also Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 96 S. Ct. 1708 (1976); Estelle v.
Williams, 96 S. Ct. 1691 (1976).
21. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 45 U.S.L.W. 4820 (U.S. June
23, 1977); Bounds v. Smith, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78
(1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S. Ct. 1551
(1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
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stitutional issues the Court chooses to resolve in prisoners' rights cases, in
the Court's willingness to devise variations on traditional constitutional tests
for use solely in the context of these cases, and in the way the Court applies
these tests to particular fact situations. The Court in thesedecisions appears
not only to disfavor substantive constitutional rights,22 but also to protect
prisoners' interests only insofar as the state acquiesces in or reveals that it
has already recognized the interest.2"
A. Avoidance of Substantive Constitutional Issues
In three cases the Supreme Court has expressly avoided the issue of
prisoners' substantive constitutional rights. The most striking example is
Procunier v. Martinez.24 In spite of the fact that the case had been argued in
the lower courts from the prisoner's perspective, the majority of the Court in
Martinez declined to confront the issue of the extent to which the incarcer-
ated still enjoy First Amendment rights.2 5 When prisoners challenged prison
censorship of inmate correspondence, the majority avoided the state's argu-
ment that "an inmate's rights with reference to social correspondence are
something fundamentally different than those enjoyed by his free
brother." 2 6 The Court chose instead to evaluate the constitutionality of the
censorship practices in the context of the First Amendment rights of those
with whom the prisoners corresponded, who were also affected by the
censorship."
In the more recent decision of Montanye v. Haymes,28 the Supreme
Court never confronted the substantive issue raised by a prisoner who al-
U.S. 396.(1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). Two other Supreme.Court
decisions, although not dealing with constitutional rights of persons confined within a
prison, will also be mentioned: Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), and Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
22. The phrase "substantive constitutional rights" is used to denote those rights
that do not derive implicitly from the due process and equal protection guarantees in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
23. Throughout this article, the term "state" is used in its broadest sense, to de-
note the political sovereign. Thus, the federal government may be referred to as the state.
24. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
25. Id. at 408.
26. Id. at 409 (quoting from the appellant's brief).
27. Compare Justice Powell's majority opinion in Martinez with Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 835-36 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850-75 (Powell, J., dissenting). It should
be noted here that in Martinez the Court was willing to recognize that prisoners possess
First Amendment rights for the limited purpose of finding a "liberty" interest under the
due process clause. 416 U.S. at 418. In addition, the Court refused to abstain from ad-
dressing the constitutional rights of free persons, as it was urged to do by the defendants.
Id. at 400-04.
28. 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976).
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leged that he had been transferred from one prison to another in retaliation
for circulating a petition among inmates, conduct that arguably is protected
by the First Amendment.2" The Court instead confined its discussion to
consideration of whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires that prisoners be given some sort of procedural protection
before they are transferred between penal institutions. As the dissenters
noted, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals because it
disagreed with the analysis given the Fourteenth Amendment due process
issue, but it did not explain why that judgment should not be upheld on First
Amendment grounds."
In one other case the Supreme Court refused to define not only the
substantive First and Sixth Amendment rights of prisoners, but also their
Fourteenth Amendment rights. In Wolffv. McDonnell,31 the Court declined
to confront directly an assertion that a prisoner's First, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were infringed by a prison practice of opening mail
between attorneys and inmates. The majority noted that the constitutional
status of the rights asserted was far from clear and stated that it "need not
decide, however, which, if any, of the asserted rights are operative here, for
the question is whether, assuming some constitutional right is implicated, it
is infringed by the procedure now found acceptable by the State.' '32 The
Court concluded that the procedure utilized by the state violated no constitu-
tional rights.
In Martinez, Montanye, and Wolff, the Supreme Court was given the
opportunity to resolve a dispute on the basis of several constitutional
grounds. In each case, the Court consciously chose to resolve the dispute
without delineating the scope of substantive constitutional rights of prison-
ers. In Martinez, the Court focused on the First Amendment rights of free
persons rather than on those of the prisoners. The focus in Wolff was on the
interests of prisoners, but the Court refused to specify whether or not the
decision was based on a substantive constitutional right. In Montanye, the
majority of the Court simply ignored the substantive Firsl Amendment is-
sue.
3 3
29. The Court described the inmate's § 1983 complaint as one that challenged the
defendant's conduct on the grounds that it interfered with his right to petition the courts
for redress of grievances and retaliated against him for exercising that right. Id. at 2545.
The court of appeals did not construe the petition as raising a First Amendment issue. See
Haymes v. Montanye, 505 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1974).
30. 96 S. Ct. at 2548 (Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
31. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
32. Id. at 576.
33. For an example of the Supreme Court's avoidance of substantive constitutional
issues, see Burrell v. McCray, 96 S. Ct. 2640 (1976). The Court had initially granted a
writ of certiorari raising the issue of whether or not the court of appeals correctly found
that prison officials had acted in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
[Vol. 4
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B. The Procedural Protections of the Due Process Clause
Although in each of the three foregoing cases the Court avoided the
substantive constitutional issue, it did address itself to the applicability to
prisoners of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 This
appears to be one constitutional provision that the Court is willing to apply
to prisoners.
One might once reasonably have believed that the Supreme Court
would confront procedural constitutional questions under the due process
clause and would protect prisoners from arbitrary government actions even
if to do so would be to interfere substantially with prison administration. For
example, in Wolff v. McDonnell,3 5 Morrissey v. Brewer,3" and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli,37 the Supreme Court extended considerable procedural protec-
tions to prisoners, parolees, and probationers deprived of good conduct
credits, parole, and probation, respectively. In all three cases, the Court held
that persons convicted of crimes enjoyed a liberty interest under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that was worthy of constitu-
tional protection and, accordingly, imposed numerous procedural restric-
tions on state conduct.3 8 In addition, although the Court avoided resolving
cruel and unusual punishment. The Court then dismissed the writ as having been improvi-
dently granted, without further explanation. Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded, in
dissent, that "the Court is not pursuing our 'duty to avoid decision of constitutional is-
sues' only where reason and principle justify doing so; rather, this is plainly an instance
where 'avoidance becomes evasion.' " Id. at 2642. In another case, the Supreme Court
also refused to reach the merits of a prisoner's claim that the parole release decision must
be accompanied by procedural safeguards. Scott v. Kentucky Parole Bd., 429 U.S. 60
(1976). Instead, the Court returned the caseto the lower court for determination of
whether the issue had become moot. See also Bradford v. Weinstein, 423 U.S. 147
(1975).
In addition, one should note the dissenters' complaint in Bounds v. Smith, 97 S. Ct.
1491, 1501-04 (1977) that the majority failed to pinpoint a source of the constitutional
right of access to the courts.
34. Where the federal government is concerned, of course, the applicable constitu-
tional amendment is the Fifth, which, for due process purposes, is interpreted like the
Fourteenth.
35. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
36. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
37. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
38. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72 (1974), held that an inmate subject
to disciplinary action is entitled to advance written notice, at least twenty-four hoursto
prepare a response, a written statement of the evidence on which the finder of fact relied
and reasons for the disciplinary action, the right to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence unless unduly hazardous to institutional goals, and a limited right to assistance in
presentation of his case. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484-89 (1972), held that-a
parolee is entitled to a prelimary hearing by someone not directly involved in the case,
written notice of the alleged violation, an opportunity to appear and present evidence in
his own behalf, a limited right to confrontation of adverse witnesses, a statement of rea-
sons for the preliminary findings, and a final hearing at which he must be given notice of'
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the issue of whether prisoners enjoyed First Amendment rights that would
preclude censorship of their personal correspondence in Procunier v. Mar-
tinez," it was willing to require that prison censorship or withholding of the
delivery of a particular item of inmate correspondence be accompanied by
procedural safeguards in order to protect the prisoners' rights.4" The Court
reasoned:
The interest of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored com-
munication by letter, grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly
a "liberty" interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
even though qualified of necessity by the circumstances of imprison-
ment. As such, it is protected from arbitrary governmental invasion.41
The Court therefore required that prisoners and their correspondents be
given notice and an opportunity to be heard in a neutral forum after the
censorship of any mail.42 On the basis of these decisions, one might have
argued that the Court's interpretation of procedural constitutional issues
signified a willingness to interfere with prison administration.
1. The Effect of the 1976 Decisions
Three recent decisions, however, have undermined the potential for
judicial intercession in the administration of prisons. In Meachum v. Fano,4"
Montanye v. Haymes," and Moody v. Daggett,4" the Supreme Court, in an
extreme gesture of deference to prison officials and interests, declared that
the state is not restricted in regulating the rights enjoyed by inmates unless it
first declares that the inmate has some vested interest in or expectation of
enjoying those rights.
In Meachum and Montanye, prisoners argued that without due process
protections they could not be transferred from one prison institution to
another, either (1) for disciplinary reasons or (2) if the transfer resulted in a
substantial change in the conditions of confinement. The prisoners' argu-
ments appeared to be supportable in light of prior imposition of procedural
the parole violation, disclosure of the evidence against him, an opportunity to appear and
present evidence, a limited right to cross-examine witnesses, a neutral hearing officer, and
a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782-91 (1973) held that a probationer is entitled to the Morrissey
protections and a limited right to counsel.
39. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
40. An inmate must be notified of the retention of a letter written by or to him, the
author must be given an opportunity to protest that retention, and complaints must be con-
sidered by a prison official other than the one who originally withheld the letter. Id. at
418-19.
41. Id. at 418.
42. Id. at 418-19. See note 40 supra.
43. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
44. 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976).
45. 429 U.S. 78 (1976).
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safeguards in Morrissey, Gagnon, and Wolff.46 The Supreme Court held,
however, that:
[N]o Due Process Clause liberty interest of a duly convicted prison
inmate is infringed when he is transferred from one prison to another
within the State, whether with or without a hearing, absent some right or
justifiable expectation rooted in state law that he will not be transferred
except for misbehavior or upon the occurrence of other specified
events.47
The Court distinguished Wolff on the grounds that in that case the state had
already granted prisoners a specific privilege of good time credits which,
under state law, could not be taken away unless forfeited by the prisoner's
conduct.48 In fact, the Court went so far as to resurrect the principle underly-
ing the old hands-off doctrine, stating the anticipated effect of imposing
procedural restrictions on inmate transfers:
[It] would place the [due process] Clause astride the day-to-day
functioning of state prisons and involve the judiciary in issues and
discretionary decisions that are not the business of federal judges ...
The federal courts do not sit to supervise state prisons, the administration
of which is of acute interest to the States. a
In Moody, the Court rejected the notion that every action having ad-
verse consequences for federal prison inmates automatically activates a due
process right. The Court stated that as long as Congress gives federal prison
officials "full discretion to control [the] conditions of confinement," a
prisoner has "no legitimate statutory or constitutional entitlement sufficient
to invoke due process""0 -protections against the issuance, without execu-
tion, of a detainer warrant against him.
Meachum, Montanye, and Moody, considered in conjunction with Pro-
cunier v. Martinez,51 indicate that unless the Supreme Court can identify a
liberty or property interest rooted in state law or practice or in the Constitu-
tion, prisoners will not be guaranteed the procedural protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment.52 The Court's deference to the state's interest in
46. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
47. Montanye v. Haymes, 96 S. Ct. 2543, 2547 (1976).
48. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225-27 (1976). See Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). The Court also presumably believed that Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972), was distinguishable on similar grounds, as it rejected the dissenting
opinion of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, who relied on Morrissey. 427 U.S. at
229-35.
49. Id. at 228-29.
50. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976).
51. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
52. Compare these cases with Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 (1971). In that
case, an inmate whose parole had been revoked by the Federal Parole Board because of
his association with other ex-convicts challenged the revocation. The Court conceded that
the parole board has broad authority to set conditions under 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a) (1970),
but held that because the board's own regulations required satisfactory evidence of a vio-
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maintaining effective penal administration for purposes of identifying liberty
and property interests thus undercuts what was thought to be a major con-
stitutional limitation on arbitrary government action affecting the lives of
prisoners.
2. Limitations on Due Process
The Court's definition of protectible liberty and property interests is not
the only way in which it defers to state officials and governmental interests
in applying the due process clause in the prison setting. Once the Court
determines that a prisoner does have a liberty or property interest that is
entitled to protection, the Court must then determine how much process is
required. When a free person asserts a deprivation of liberty or property
without due process of law, the Court balances the free person's interest in
procedural protections against the interests of the state in not being unduly
restricted by those procedures.5" When a prisoner asserts a constitutional
right to certain procedural protections, however, the Court often ignores the
interests of the prisoner in having a particular procedure followed. In resolv-
ing a prisoner's due process claim, the Court tends to defer to the state and to
balance one state interest against another.
Wolff v. McDonnell,54 Gagnon v. Scarpelli,"5 and Morrissey v. Bre-
wer56 all demonstrate the Court's siibstitution of state interests for individual
ones in determining the due process rights of prisoners. For example, the
interests of the state in its penal system are commonly described as the
deterrence of crime through isolation of the offender, discipline, institu-
tional order and security, and rehabilitation.5" In Wolff, Gagnon, and Mor-
rissey the Court relied heavily on the state's interest in the rehabilitation of
its prisoners in requiring the incorporation of certain protections into the
procedures for discipline, probation revocation, and parole revocation. In
Morrissey, the Court acknowledged that its decision to require procedural
lation of parole conditions before parole could be revoked, the revocation in this case was
improper. In Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973), a probationer challenged his pro-
bation revocation for failure to report any arrest to his probation officer without delay, as
required by the conditions of his probation. The Supreme Court held that the record was
so devoid of evidentiary support for the conclusions on which revocation was based that
the due process clause was violated. In both Arciniega and Douglas, the Supreme Court
restricted government's actions only insofar as those actions seemed to be inconsistent
with rules and regulations the government itself had established.
53. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
54. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
55. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
56. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Morrissey and Gagnon do not technically involve chal-
lenges to prison conditions or rules, but they were later relied on by the Court in Wolff in
extending procedural protections to prisoners during disciplinary hearings.
57. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974).
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protections was based as much on the interests of society as on those of the
prisoner:
The parolee is not the only one who has a stake in his conditional liberty.
Society has a stake in whatever may be the chance of restoring him to
normal and useful life within the law. Society thus has an interest in not
having parole revoked because of erroneous information or because of an
erroneous evaluation of the need to revoke parole given the breach of
parole conditions. . . . And society has a further interest in treating the
parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations will
enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrari-
ness.
58
Thus, the Court's balancing of various state interests affects the measure of
due process it will guarantee to prisoners.
In applying the due process clause, the Supreme Court defers to the
state in one additional respect-in its consideration of administrative ob-
jectives. The Court has repeatedly, and in numerous situations, noted that
procedural protections under the Constitution vary according to the nature of
the governmental function involved as well as the private interest affected by
government action.59 In the prison context, the Court has stated that "there
must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives
and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.' '60 In
attempting to accommodate due process principles to the penological object-
ive of rehabilitation and the institutional need for security and internal order,
the Supreme Court has been extremely deferential to prison officials. For
example, the Court is willing to refuse rights of confrontation and cross-
examination to prisoners accused of violating institutional rules. A prison
disciplinary committee may even act against prisoners on the basis of facts
brought to its attention after the conclusion of the disciplinary hearing.6
When two courts of appeals attempted to go beyond the minimal pro-
tections for disciplinary proceedings set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell,6 the
Supreme Court reversed them in a pointed decision. 3 The Court stated that
the appellate courts' requirement of mandatory "confrontation and cross-
examination, except where prison officials can justify their denial on one or
more grounds that appeal to judges, effectively preempts the area that Wolff
left to the sound descretion of prison officials."64 In Wolff and in Gagnon v.
58. 408 U.S. at 484. See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1974);
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973).
59. See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
60. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
61. Baxter v. Palimigiano, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 n.5 (1976).
62. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
63. Baxter v. PalImigiano, 96 S. Ct. 1551 (1976).
64. Id. at 1560. The Court admits, moreover, that it is not deferring to prison regu-
lations or practices that are concedely implementing legitimate government objections. As
the Court said in Wolff "The better course at this time, in a period where prison practices
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Scarpelli," the Court restricted the use of counsel in probation revocation
and disciplinary proceedings primarily because it did not wish to transform
what it considered to be a rehabilitative proceeding into an adversary pro-
ceeding."6 The Court also gave weight to the state's argument in Wolff that
the procedures governing disciplinary hearings could themselves be relevant
to rehabilitation; they should therefore not be too inflexible because some
prisoners might require swift punishment while others would be amenable to
more leisurely hearings.67
With respect to the Supreme Court's analysis of prisoners' rights under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, one might argue that
the Court subjects prisoners to a test no different from that applied to free
persons and that it defers to the state no more than is usual in other due
process cases. Under this argument, in every situation in which an indi-
vidual, free or incarcerated, asserts a right to due process of law, the Su-
preme Court searches for a liberty or. a property interest; but the Court
recently has been reluctant to find-such an interest in any context lacking
some specific constitutional right or state-created expectation or privilege.68
Notwithsianding this argument, one cannot ignore the fact that the adverse
impact of the Court's due process analysis is greater for prisoners than for
free persons. Free persons enjoy the protection of substantive constitutional
rights from which a liberty or property interest may arise. But the Supreme
Court has been parsimonious in meting out recognition of substantive con-
stitutional rights for prisoners.69 Consequently, as long as the Court avoids
are diverse and somewhat experimental, is to leave these matters to the sound discretion
of the officials of state prisons." 418 U.S. at 569. Yet in other contexts, the Court has
refused to defer absolutely to the state in the latter's treatment of individuals. See O'Con-
nor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942). But see Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1956).
65. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
66. 418 U.S. at 570; 411 U.S. at 787-88. See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S. Ct.
1551, 1556 (1976).
67. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1974). See also McGinnis v.
Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973), in which the Court deferred to the state's assertion of a
connection between rehabilitation and the granting of.good time credits, and upheld the
denial of good time credits to persons incarcerated before sentencing because of an inabil-
ity to post bail. In DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960), the Court held that a law
prohibiting persons convicted of felonies from holding office in any waterfront labor or-
ganization was not unconstitutional. The Court stated that, "[d]uly mindful as we are of
the promising record of rehabilitation by ex-felons, and of the emphasis on rehabilitation
by modern penological efforts, it is not for this Court to substitute its judgment" for that
of the legislature. Id. at 158. Similarly, in Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417
(1974), when a convicted person asserted that he ought to be committed to rehabilitative
incarceration rather than to prison, the Supreme Court deferred to the prior decision of
Congress to commit only narcotics addicts with less than two prior felony convictions to a
rehabilitative commitment in lieu of penal incarceration.
68. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
69. See text accompanying notes 24-33 supra.
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defining prisoners' substantive constitutional rights and leaves to the state
the identification of protectible liberty and property interests, prisoners
have, for all practical purposes, no due process guarantees beyond those the
state affords them."0
C. The First Amendment
1. The Court's First Amendment Test
One substantive constitutional right the Court has purportedly defined
for prisoners is that grounded on the First Amendment. The "Court rarely
defers significantly to government conduct that restricts First Amendment
rights. Nonetheless, when prisoners are involved, the Court defers to the
state, just as it does when applying the due process clause. It does so by
adopting a constitutional test that avoids the exacting scrutiny required under
traditional First Amendment analysis, as well as by substituting society's
interests for those of the prisoner in rendering First Amendment review. In
fact, in the First Amendment cases, one can discern an equal protection
emphasis that, by definition, results in judicial deference to customary
prison practices.
Although the Court refused to reach the First Amendment issue in
Procunier v. Martinez"' and Montanye v. Haymes, " it finally did so in Pell
v. Procunierr' and Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union."4 Pell in-
volved a challenge to prison restrictions on face-to-face interviews between
journalists and specifically designated prisoners. The Court upheld the right
of prison officials to restrict such interviews, notwithstanding the, fact that
prisoners' First Amendment rights were correspondingly limited. In Jones,
the Court upheld a prison prohibition on solicitation of union membership.
The most important aspect of the Pell and Jones decisions is not that the
Court refused to rule in favor of prisoners on the merits of the constitutional
claim, but rather the process of analysis used in resolving the First Amend-
ment issue.
It is difficult to determine by what standard the Court measured prison-
ers' First Amendment rights in Pell. Nowhere in the opinion does the Court
70. Not all state-defined interests that a prisoner can expect to enjoy are necessarily
protected by the Constitution. In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 (1976), the
Court stated that lesser penalties imposed by prison officials may not trigger the due proc-
ess clause. See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 594 (1974) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting in part and concurring in the result in part).
71. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
72. 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976). See text accompanying notes 24-33 supra.
73. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
74. 45 U.S.L.W. 4820 (U.S. June 23. 1977).
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employ the traditional First Amendment test used in Martinez, in which the
interests of unincarcerated persons were at stake. In Martinez, the Court
stated that a prison regulation infringing upon the First Amendment rights of
free persons would be held constitutional only if it furthered "an important
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expres-
sion" and even then "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be
no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular
governmental interest involved." 5 In Pell, however, the closest the Su-
preme Court came to articulating a constitutional test for prisoners' First
Amendment rights is its statement that "a prison inmate retains those First
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or
with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." 76 That
test was cited with approval in Jones."
The Pell-Jones test is far different from that enunciated in Martinez,
which, if applied to prisoners, would allow a prisoner's First Amendment
rights to yield only in the face of a substantial government interest unrelated
to the supression of expression, and even then only if the restriction were no
greater than that necessary to achieve a legitimate government objective.
The test of consistency with imprisonment enabled the Supreme Court to
hold that prisoners' First Amendment rights are not violated by a regulation
banning face-to-face interviews between inmates and the press when there
are reasonable alternative means of communication with persons outside the
prison." The Court reached that conclusion in spite of the fact that it
"would find the availability of such alternatives unimpressive if they were
submitted as justification for governmental restriction of personal communi-
cation among members of the general public."7 9
The Pell-Jones test is a strange bedfellow for the First Amendment,
which traditionally has beeh construed with little deference to governmental
interests that conflict with the individual's freedom of expression."s In
neither Pell nor Jones did the Supreme Court adopt a presumption against
the constitutional validity of restrictions on an inmate's free speech, and the
Court's consistency test imposed no heavy burden of justification on the
government for its conduct.8 ' Under Pell and Jones, any time a prisoner
75. 416 U.S. at 413.
76. 417 U.S. at 822 (emphasis added). Compare Pell with Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 422 (1974) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring).
77. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4822, 4823.
78. 417 U.S. at 823. See also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 45
U.S.L.W. 4820, 4823 (U.S. June 23, 1977).
79. Id. at 825.
80. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
81. In fact, in Jones the majority simply held the government to a mere rationality
standard. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4823, 4824. In contrast, consider the heavy burden imposed on
the government when the press challenges a prison ban on face-to-face interviews. See
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974).
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asserts a First Amendment right that is simply inconsistent or incompatible
with a right or interest asserted by the government, the prisoner's right must
yield.
2. Disregard of the Prisoner's Individual Interest in First Amendment Freedoms
The Supreme Court's deference to prison officials and government
interests extends beyond the Court's substitution of the Pell-Jones stan-
dard for the traditional strict scrutiny of First Amendment analysis. In addi-
tion, in applying the consistency standard, the Court appears to deem the
interests of the state or society as those that are dispositive of the First
Amendment issue within the prison setting; the prisoner's individual interest
in free speech is largely ignored. The Court simply identifies society's
interest in a particular practice or procedure and then balances that state
interest against a contrary state interest affected by the practice in order to
arrive at a definition of prisoners' rights.
For example, Justice Stewart, in upholding the ban on inmate-press
interviews in Pell, was careful to note that the regulation was not an attempt
to conceal prison conditions from the public.82 Presumably, if the regulation
had been directed to this end, society's interests would have been adversely
affected and Justice Stewart would have been more willing to hold the
regulation unconstitutional. Thus, his analysis turns in large part on asses-
sing the interests of the state or society, rather than those of the prisoner.
Similarly, in Procunier v. Martinez,83 Justices Brennan and Marshall ob-
jected to the reading of inmate mail not only because it violated prisoners'
First Amendment rights, but also because it "chills the communication
necessary to inform the public on this issue [and] is at odds with the most
basic tenets of the guarantee of freedom of speech.''84
The most telling examples of the inclination to ignore the prisoner's
interest in First Amendment analysis are found in Justice Powell's separate
opinions in Pella5 and Saxbe v. Washington Post.8" In Pell, the majority of
the Court confronted the First Amendment issue it had avoided in Martinez,
and although it ultimately rejected the prisoners' arguments, it did concede
that prisoners retain First Amendment rights.8 7 The Court was also asked, in
Pell and in Saxbe, to decide the First Amendment issue of access by the
press. As in the prisoners' challenge, the Court refused to declare uncon-
stitutional the ban on face-to-face interviews with designated inmates on the
82. 417 U.S. at 830.
83. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
84. Id. at 427.
85. 417 U.S. at 835-36 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86. 417 U.S. 843, 850-75 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
87. 417 U.S. at 822.
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basis of the First Amendment rights of the press. Justice Powell agreed with
the majority in Pell that "inmates as individuals [do not] have a personal
constitutional right to demand interviews with willing reporters." 8 He dis-
agreed however, with the majority's position that the press does not possess
a First Amendment right to have face-to-face interviews with inmates.
Justice Powell's position that the prison interview ban is unconstitu-
tional as a violation of First Amendment rights of the press, but not those of
prisoners, is understandable only if one recognizes that he ignores the indi-
vidual interest in free speech that the First Amendment protects. In his Saxbe
dissent, Justice Powell noted that the First Amendment protects two kinds of
interests:
There is an individual interest, the need of many men to express their
opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth living, and a social
interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not only adopt
the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way.89
In resolving a First Amendment issue, Justice Powell presumably would
balance both of these interests against any government interest allegedly
served by a restriction on free speech. The government interests in a ban on
inmate-press interviews are related to "security considerations,'"'9 which
may possibly arise from severe disciplinary problems generated by the inter-
views.91 These interests do not vary depending on whether the inmate or the
press challenges the ban. Thus, for Justice Powell to reach different conclu-
sions for inmates and the press regarding their challenges to the ban on
interviews, he must attach a different weight to the First Amendment inter-
ests asserted by each. According to him, the First Amendment rights of the
press are closely linked to society's interest in being informed of the affairs
of government. That interest is obviously one to which Justice Powell at-
taches great weight;92 however, he pays little attention either to the "indi-
vidualistic values" of the First Amendment 93 or to the prisoner's interest in
First Amendment rights, which serves largely the individual "human spirit"
rather than "the polity." 94
It is not unusual in First Amendment cases for the Supreme Court to be
influenced by society's interest in being informed of the affairs of govern-
88. Id. at 835-36 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Z. CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1954)).
90. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830 (1974).
91. Id. at 832.
92. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 861-63 (1974) (Powell, J., dis-
senting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835-36 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
93. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing).




ment. After all, that is what some would call the central purpose of the First
Amendment.95 It is likewise not unusual for the Court to include a reference
to the interests of society among its justifications for any decision. It is
unusual, however, for justices in First Amendment cases to completely
ignore the personal interest the speaker has in communication. Only Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas have expressly acknowledged the indi-
vidual interests that First Amendment freedoms involve for prisoners.96
3. The Equal Protection Emphasis
The Court appears to emphasize the equal protection aspects of First
Amendment claims of prisoners. In so doing, the Court is reluctant to
protect any inmate's First Amendment rights unless prison officials have
already, in some way, extended that right to other inmates. Two relatively
early Supreme Court opinions, Cooper v. Pate9" and Cruz v. Beto,9 suggest
that the Court may only be willing to protect prisoners' First Amendment
rights against unequal restrictions imposed by prison administrators. Al-
though both of these decisions have been cited for the proposition that
prisoners retain First Amendment rights during incarceration,99 the opinions
themselves are sufficiently ambiguous to be read as standing only for the
proposition that prison officials must not deny First Amendment privileges
in an unequal manner.
In Cooper, a prisoner alleged that because of his religious beliefs he
was denied permission to purchase "religious publications and denied other
privileges enjoyed by other prisoners."' The Supreme Court did not reach
the merits of the First Amendment issue, but noted that the prisoner's
complaint stated a cause of action and remanded the case for consideration
of the merits of the complaint. The Court's opinion, at a minimum, could be
construed as an affirmance of a prisoner's right not to be treated differently
from other prisoners solely because of his religious beliefs.' The same is
true of the Supreme Court's characterization of the complaint in Cruz.
Although the Court in Cruz made some relatively broad statements about
prisoners' constitutional rights, those statements did not necessarily relate to
the merits of the complaint. They concerned the right of access to the courts,
95. See, e.g., Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Mean-
ing of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191; Meiklejohn, The First Amend-
ment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245.
96. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 422-23 (1974) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
concurring); id. at 428 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
97. 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
98. 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
99. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); Procunier v. Mar-
tinez, 416 U.S. 396, 422 & n.1 (1974) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
100. 378 U.S. 546 (emphasis added).
101. See also Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165, 166 (7th Cir. 1963).
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which the district court presumably denied to Cruz when it refused to grant
him a hearing on the merits of his complaint."0 2 In addressing the merits of
the case, the Court described the complaint as essentially alleging a denial of
equal protection."0 3 The per curiam opinion of the Court stressed the fact
that Cruz claimed he was being denied a freedom to practice religion "com-
parable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conven-
tional religious precepts."' 4 Thus, although Justices Marshall and Brennan
cite Cruz as authority for the proposition that "a prisoner does not shed...
basic First Amendment Rights at the prison gate," 1 ' and a subsequent
majority opinion cited Cruz in passing for the proposition that prisoners
enjoy "substantial religious freedom,""'° it is possible that the position
taken by Justice Rehnquist in Cruz represents more clearly its significance:
"Presumably prison officials are not obligated to provide facilities for any
particular denominational services within a prison, although once they
undertake to provide them for some they must make only such reasonable
distinctions that they may survive analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause." 0 7 Under both Cooper and Cruz, it is arguably unclear whether the
Court will protect an inmate's First Amendment rights unless prison officials
discriminate between different classes of inmates in allowing the exercise of
those rights. 0 8
In other First Amendment cases, the Court's equal protection emphasis
is more subtle. It may arise simply because the Court, in deferring to the
so-called "expertise" of prison officials,0 9 entertains a presumption that the
best and most reliable evidence of the inconsistency of a particular First
Amendment right with institutional needs is the prison officials' failure to
102. The right of access language could also refer to one of the allegations in
Cruz's complaint. See Cruz v. Beto, 445 F.2d 801, 802 (5th Cir. 1971).
103. 405 U.S. at 320.
104. Id. at 322. See also Cruz v. Beto, 445 F.2d 801, 802 (5th Cir. 1971). The
only First Amendment claim raised by Cruz was his assertion that being deprived of
newspapers and other reading materials infringed his First Amendment right to learn about
national affairs. Id. The Supreme Court opinion did not even refer to this claim.
105. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 422 & n.1 (1974).
106. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
107. 405 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although Justice Rehnquist made
these remarks in a dissent in Cruz, they are descriptive of what he believes to be the
assumption of the entire Court. There is no intimation that he and the other members of
the Court disagree on this point.
108. Even an equal protection perspective does not guarantee protection for First
Amendment rights, however. In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 45
U.S.L.W. 4820 (U.S. June 23, 1977), the Supreme Court refused to hold unconstitutional
prison regulations limiting mailing of union-related materials and meetings under the equal
protection clause because prison regulations did not similarly restrict other prisoner or-
ganizations.
109. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 600 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in the result in part).
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extend that right to any prison inmate."' That is, once prison officials
extend a particular First Amendment right to any inmate, the Court may be
persuaded that the privilege is compatible with institutional needs and ob-
jectives, and the Court may require the prison officials to justify any sub-
sequent denial of the privilege to other inmates. If, however, prison officials
consistently deny a particular privilege equally to all inmates, the Court will
not be persuaded by other evidence that the privilege can feasibly be ex-
tended to inmates without sacrificing institutional objectives.
The heavy presumption that arises because of the Court's deference to
the expertise of prison officials is suggested in the cases of Pell v. Pro-
cunier"' and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co." 2 Both involved First
Amendment challenges to prison restrictions in inmate-press interviews. In
Pell, prisoners claimed the First Amendment right, while in Saxbe it was
claimed by journalists. The Court in1Pel stated that, "in the absence of
substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the [prison] officials have
exaggerated their response to these [institutional] considerations, courts
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.''113 In
regard to Pell, it is difficult to assess just what sort of evidence would
amount to "substantial evidence" of an exaggerated response to institu-
tional needs. In relation to Saxbe, however, where the Court also accorded
great deference to the expertise of prison officials,' it is possible to
evaluate the precise meaning of "substantial evidence."
It was argued in Saxbe that the United States Bureau of Prisons could
not constitutionally adopt a sweeping ban on press interviews with specific
prisoners, but must narrowly draft a selective policy that would preclude
interviews only in those instances when they would create severe discipli-
nary problems." 5 The Director of the Bureau of Prisons objected that a
110. The willingness of the Court to defer to the expertise and discretion of prison
ddministrators became undeniably apparent in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union,
45 U.S.L.W. 4820 (U.S. June 23, 1977), in which the Court repeatedly insisted on that
deference. Id. at 4821-22, 4822, 4824, 4825.
111. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
112. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
113. 417 U.S. at 827.
114. The Court in Saxbe overturned a district court decree that prison officials
could deny press interviews only if they found that a particular interview would lead to
disciplinary problems. The Court reached this result by deferring to the "expert and pro-
fessional judgment" of prison officials that "such a selective policy would spawn serious
discipline and morale problems of its own by engendering hostility and resentment among
inmates who were refused interview privileges granted to their fellows." 417 U.S. at 849.
Although the Court did not confront the issue of prisoners' rights in Saxbe, its analyt-
ical approach is relevant to this discussion. Presumably the Court would have weighed the
evidence of the institutional need for a ban on press-inmate interviews from the same
perspective had it been presented by prisoners in the companion case of Pell.
115. Id. at 844-45.
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selective policy should not be required because " 'one of the very basic
tenets of sound correctional administration'. is 'to treat all inmates incarcer-
ated in [the] institutions, as far as possible, equally.' "116 The Supreme
Court acknowledged that this "expert and professional judgment is, of
course, entitled to great deference.''117 In spite of the fact that extensive
evidence regarding the .effect of the interview ban on prisoner-press com-
munication"' and the limited disciplinary problems engendered by such
communications had been presented-," 9 and in spite of the fact that the
district court found from the evidence that "the remedy of no interview of
any inmate is broader than is necessary to avoid the concededly real"
disciplinary problems, 2 ' the Supreme Court appeared unwilling to recog-
nize a First Amendment right as long as the impact of that denial was felt
equally by all inmates. Thus, no amount of evidence was "substantial"
enough to outweigh the presumption of consistency raised by the Board's
refusal to extend the interview right to any inmate.
The Court avoided actually deciding the Saxbe case on the basis of the
Bureau of Prison's opposition to an interview policy that would not treat all
inmates equally. Instead, it decided that bans on face-to-face interviews
between inmates and representatives of the news media did not violate the
First Amendment because " '[n]ewsmen have no constitutional right of
access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general pub-
lic.' "121 Even that analysis incorporates an equal protection perspective. As
the dissenting justices noted, the Court justified the interview ban (and
presumably' could justify any restriction on First Amendment rights in the
prison setting) simply because it had an equal impact upon all concerned.122
The major problem in this analysis is that, by definition, an equal
protection approach gives prison officials the ultimate choice of what rights
or privileges prisoners will enjoy. In applying an equal protection standard,
the Court has only to determine whether the Constitution requires equal
116. Id. at 849. (quoting testimony of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 853 n.4.
119. Id. at 866-69.
120. Id. at 868. Testimony from penal administrators in four jurisdictions having an
"open-interview" policy was included. Id. at 869 n.15.
121. Id. at 849-50 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974)).
122. 417 U.S. at 857 (Brennan, Marshall & Powell, JJ., dissenting). See also Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-42 (1974). The Supreme Court may soon elaborate on
its decisions in Pell and Saxbe. Mr. Justice Rehnquist has granted a stay of an injunction
giving the media greater access than is enjoyed by members of the general public to the
jail of Alameda County, California. He perceives the issue in the case to be whether Pell
and Saxbe require adherence to a "no greater access" standard, or whether such a stan-
dard is applicable only when prison officials have already afforded substantial press and
public access to a prison. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 773 (1977).
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treatment of all prisoners once prison officials choose to give some prisoners
a particular privilege; it does not have to decide whether the government is
constitutionally required to extend to any inmate a particular First Amend-
ment right that has been denied to all inmates.
To be sure, the First Amendment does depend, to some degree, on
notions of equality.'23 The Court has not, however, generally substituted an
equal protection analysis for traditional First Amendment tests. 24
Moreover, when the Court makes such a substitution in other contexts, the
equal protection standard operates to protect the First Amendment rights of
free persons in a way in which it cannot protect those of prisoners. For
example, if restrictions on free speech are subjected to equal protection
review, one can be almost certain that the free speech of unincarcerated
persons will be broadly protected. That protection exists because the only
way in which a government can suppress, for example, a dissident's politi-
cal speech without denying equal protection is for it also to suppress the
speech of all other political groups. Because the impact of an equally-
applied prohibition of all political speech would be felt not only by dissi-
dents but also by lawmakers and majority political groups, the principle of
equality would be an effective check on the suppression of dissident political
speech. If, however, the only constitutional restriction on prison regulations
prohibiting dissident political speech among inmates is that all inmates be
treated equally, the speech of politically dissident prisoners is likely to be
curtailed. Prison officials who are told that they can prohibit the political
speech of inmates as long as they do so with respect to all prisoners will have
an incentive to withdraw the privilege of speech from all inmates in order to
suppress that of the dissidents. Such a withdrawal would satisfy the equality
concerns of the Supreme Court, would be permissible as long as the Court
refused to define the substantive First Amendment rights of prisoners ac-
cording to traditional tests, and, having no impact on the unincarcerated
lawmakers, would not motivate them to refrain from suppressing political
speech. An equal protection analysis would offer protection to prisoners
only if the Court were to compare prisoners' First Amendment rights with
those of free persons. Such a comparison is unlikely, given the fact that the
Court has accepted a similar comparison in only a limited number of cases,
none of which pertains directly to prison conditions."'
.123. See, e.g., Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43
U. CH. L. REV. 20 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Karst]. See also Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
124. See Karst, supra note 123.
125. See, e.g., Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942), in which a prisoner al-
leged that prison officials prevented him from filing a petition with a court, which preju-
diced his right of appeal. The Supreme Court said that if the allegations were true, a
violation of the prisoner's equal protection rights had occurred because Kansas had re-
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The Court's First Amendment analysis is as unsatisfactory for prisoners
as its due process analysis. Because of the Court's reliance on a lenient
constitutional test of consistency, its disregard of the individual interests
protected by the First Amendment, and its use of an equal protection stan-
dard for First Amendment analysis in the prison setting, prison officials are
left with the ultimate choice of what First Amendment rights prisoners may
enjoy.
D. Access to the Courts
The inmate's right of access to the courts is another right that has been
directly confronted by the Supreme Court. Since Ex parte Hull," 6 the right
of access has been zealously guarded by the Court, but its exact source and
scope were uncertain. In Procunier v. Martinez"' and Wolff v. McDon-
nell,118 however, the Court did pinpoint the due process clause as the source
of the constitutional right of access to the courts. "9 The standard used by the
Court to evaluate that right was simply that "[r]egulations and practices
which unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or
other aspects of the rights of access to the courts are invalid.""'° If there are
"reasonable alternatives" to the particular legal avenue to the courts cut off
by the challenged prison regulation, that regulation does not interfere with
the right of access."' The test of unjustifiability and the reasonable alterna-
tives analysis of Martinez and Wolff are comparable to the First Amendment
analysis and test of consistency used in Pell v. Procunier"' and Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Union."3
In addition, in both Martinez and Wolff, the Supreme Court approached
the issue in the same manner in which it approaches prisoners' First
fused him privileges of appeal that it afforded to persons not in prison. In several cases
the Court has stated that persons charged with or convicted of crimes have the same right
as other persons to procedural protections of the state before they can be civilly commit-
ted. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
126. 312 U.S. 546 (1941). In addition to Hull the Supreme Court in three other
decisions has restricted state conduct on the ground that it has interfered with a constitu-
tional right of access to the courts: Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). See also
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
127. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
128. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
129. The right of access could also be viewed as a First or Sixth Amendment right.
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 575-76 (1974).
130. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974).
131. 417 U.S. 817 (1974); 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969). See text accompanying notes
75-81 supra.
132. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
133. 45 U.S.L.W. 4820 (U.S. June 23, 1977).
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Amendment rights: from an equal protection perspective. In Martinez, in-
validating as unconstitutional a prison's absolute ban on interviews by per-
sons other than licensed attorneys or private investigators, the Court em-
phasized the unequal impact of the rule on indigents.134 The Court also noted
that the state had made an irrational distinction between law students par-
ticipating in law school assistance programs and law students employed by
private practicing attorneys; the former could interview inmates, while the
latter could not. 135 In Wolff, the Court expressed an equal protection concern
for the class of indigent and illiterate inmates136 when it directed the district
court to determine whether a prison rule restricting inmate legal assistance
complied with its holding in Johnson v. Avery.137 In Johnson, an inmate had
alleged that access of prisoners to the courts was obstructed by a regulation
that prohibited prisoners from assisting one another in the preparation of
petitions for writs of habeas corpus. All members of the Supreme Court,
including the dissenters, emphasized the fact that the regulation effectively
deprived one class of inmates, the illiterate and the indigent, of access to
courts available to others.138
A recent Supreme Court majority of seven justices in Bounds v.
Smith139 held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the
courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and
filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law
libraries, or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." 14 In
reaffirming its per curiam decision in Younger v. Gilmore,141 the Court
emphasized that the right of access to the courts could be achieved by
allowing the states to experiment with a variety of legal services for prison-
ers, including libraries, para-legal assistants, law student volunteers, or
hiring of attorneys as full-time or part-time prison staff lawyers. The major-
ity stressed that "a legal access program need not include any particular
element we have discussed, and we encourage local experimentation.'"'14
The constitutional boundaries of such local experimentation, however, re-
main unclear.
134. 416 U.S. at 420. See also Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), aff'g
Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (requiring state officials to pro-
vide indigent inmates with access to a reasonably adequate law library).
135. 416 U.S. at 421.
136.. 418 U.S. at 579.
137. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
138. Id. at 487. Id. at 493-98 (Douglas, J., concurring). In addition, see the em-
phasis in Bounds v. Smith, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977).
139. 45 U.S.L.W. 4411 (U.S. April 27, 1977).
140. Id. at 4414.
141. 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
142. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4415.
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Implicit in the Court's right of access decisions is a deference to state
interests'43 and expertise,1 44 but not to the extent manifested in the Court's
opinions respecting other constitutional rights. Perhaps that is because a
prisoner's right of access to the courts is one about which the Supreme Court
is particularly sensitive. In any event, the Court's protection of a right of
access operates in the same manner that the Court's initial rejection of the
jurisdictional hands-off doctrine operated: it in no way affords extensive
recognition of substantive constitutional rights. In fact, as Justices Brennan
and Marshall note in their dissent in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'
Union, the zealous safeguarding of the right of access to the courts, coupled
with the refusal to recognize other, substantive constitutional rights, leaves
prisoners "ironically . . . with a right of access to the courts . . . but no
substantive rights to assert once they get there."' 45
E. The Eighth Amendment
Perhaps it is premature to attempt a discussion of the Supreme Court's
application of the Eighth Amendment to prison conditions. The Court has
yet to consider the merits of a fully-adjudicated Eighth Amendment claim
that prison conditions are unconstitutional.' 46 In Estelle v. Gamble, 4 ' how-
ever, it recently undertook a discussion of the Eighth Amendment's applica-
bility to prison conditions. Because of the nature of the Court's comments in
the case, it is not unreasonable to speculate that whatever the Court eventu-
ally delineates as the precise scope of the Eighth Amendment, it will
nevertheless accord substantial deference to prison officials and their inter-
ests.
In Gamble, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment is a restriction on the conditions under which
a person may be incarcerated.' 48 Gamble involved an alleged failure to
143. In Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 496-98 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring),
Justice Douglas mentioned the therapeutic value of inmate preparation of petitions alleging
constitutional rights, and its role in expanding legal assistance to inmates. Rehabilitation
is a societal interest.
144. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 420 (1974): "The extent to
which that right [of access to the courts] is burdened by a particular regulation or practice
must be weighed against the legitimate interests of penal administration and the proper
regard that judges should give to the expertise and discretionary authority of correctional
officials."
145. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4827.
146. In Burrell v. McCray, 96 S. Ct. 2640 (1976), the Court declined an opportu-
nity to hold prison conditions unconstitutional. See notes 20 and 33 supra.
147. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The discussion arose in a review of the lower court's
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim.
148. Id. at 102-06. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
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provide medical care to a prisoner, a complaint far different from those
involving sentencing; these are frequently the basis of Eighth Amendment
challenges.149 To the extent that the Court recognized the applicability of the
Eighth Amendment to a denial of medical care, it might be argued that in
Gamble the Court made a decision to broaden constitutional restrictions on
prison conditions and practices. The Gamble decision, however, erects po-
tential Eighth Amendment barriers to interference with prison administra-
tion. In the first place, the Court in Gamble applied the Eighth Amendment
to a failure to provide medical care, stating "In the worst cases, such a
failure may actually produce physical 'torture or a lingering death,'. . . the
evils of most immediate concern to the drafters of the Amendment." 150
Thus, the Court extended the amendment to cover a situation in which a
prisoner actually suffered physical pain. It said nothing about whether the
amendment should be applied to restrict administrative decisions or prison
conditions that cause, for example, severe emotional stress or strain rather
than the physical torture that was of immediate concern to the drafters of the
amendment.
Similarly, the Court may hesitate to subject prison conditions and ad-
ministrative decisions to the traditional Eighth Amendment test of consis-
tency with contemporary standards of human decency unless actual physical
pain is involved. The Court traditionally employs an Eighth Amendment test
of constitutionality that evaluates challenged punishments in light of "con-
temporary values"'' and the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." 152 In Gamble, the Court did state that in
less serious cases of failure to provide medical care, "denial of medical care
may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any
penological purpose," and that the "infliction of such unnecessary suffering
is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency." "3 The Court was
careful, however, to apply the test of contemporary values only when those
values might be offended by the infliction of unnecessary physical pain. It
did not hold that the Eighth Amendment would be violated by administrative
practices that are objectionable merely because they serve no penological
purpose or are offensive to contemporary standards of decency for some
other reason. Thus, administrative decisions and prison conditions inflicting
no unnecessary pain may be beyond the purview of the Eighth Amendment
149. A large number of opinions have dealt with the sentence itself; see, e.g.,
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958) (forfeiture of citizenship). Others have dealt with the reasons for which an indi-
vidual can be imprisoned. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (narco-
tics addiction).
150. 429 U.S. at 103 (citation omitted).
151. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
152. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
153. 429 U.S. at 103 (citations omitted).
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even if they conflict with contemporary standards of decency. In this event,
the Eighth Amendment will afford little protection to prisoners. Moreover,
by definition, a constitutional test based on contemporary standards of de-
cency places few limitations on the treatment of prisoners. If the public
tolerates any specific prison condition, the Court will likely refuse to alter
that condition by judicial decision. In fact, in prior searches for contempo-
rary standards of decency that are the basis of the Eighth Amendment test of
constitutionality, the Court has relied on legislative approval as objective
evidence of what punishments are consistent with those standards of de-
cency.'54 Thus, in Gamble the Court found evidence of contemporary stan-
dards of decency in the fact that modem legislation and the common law
imposed a duty on prison officials to give medical care to inmates not in a
position to care for themselves.155 As long as the Eighth Amendment's test
of constitutionality depends on public acceptance of government practices,
the amendment will afford prisoners only minimal protection against gov-
ernment actions.'56
More significantly, the Court in Gamble placed a possible further limi-
tation on the Eighth Amendment's applicability to prison conditions. The
Court indicated that it would rely on the subjective intent of prison admin-
istrators in determining whether the Eighth Amendment has been violated.
Over Justice Stevens' dissent,' the Court carefully limited its discussion of
the Eighth Amendment's -application in denials of medical treatment to
instances of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prison-
154. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976), in which the Su-
preme Court stated that the "legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such
standards," and was influenced by the fact that society, in re-enacting death penalty stat-
utes after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), appeared to have endorsed the death
penalty.
155. 429 U.S. at 103 n.8.
156. The Eighth Amendment would afford even less protection if the Court relied
simply on prison practices, rather than legislative standards, as evidence of standards of
decency. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). There the Court looked to the
policies of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Association of State Correctional Ad-
ministrators and stated that the practices "followed at other well-run institutions would be
relevant to a determination of the need for a particular type of restriction." Id. at 412
n.13, 414 n.14. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court ad-
verted to a survey of practices in prisons throughout the United States in order to justify
both the limitations it placed on rights of cross-examination and confrontation and the
guarantees it accorded to prisoners of written notice of disciplinary charges and a state-
ment of evidence. Id. at 565 n.16, 567 n.18. The dissenters in Wolff described routine
prison practices in support of their argument that there is no need for blanket refusals to
permit confrontation in prison disciplinary hearings. Id. at 587-89 (Brennan & Marshall,
JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). They also argued for a right of inmate
assistance on the ground that forty-one states already provide a substitute counsel to in-
mates. Id. at 592.
157. 429 U.S. at 108.
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ers.15 If the Court refuses to interfere with prison conditions and adminis-
trative practices unless deliberate violations of the Eighth Amendment are
established, it will minimize the potential impact of the amendment on
prison conditions.
An argument has been made that the Eighth Amendment should be
broadly interpreted to apply to administrative decisions and prison condi-
tions that are now left to the discretion of prison officials, because those
decisions and conditions have as great an impact on the convicted person as
do statutory sentences subject to Eighth Amendment review. 5 ' The Court
has, at least to a limited extent, reached that conclusion in Gamble. Its
opinion gives no indication, however, that it will be receptive to broad
interference with prison administration under Eighth Amendment standards.
Rather, it appears that the Court will defer, as in other instances, to existing
prison practices.
Conclusion
It should be apparent from the preceding description of the current
status of prisoners' constitutional rights that the Supreme Court is reluctant
to abandon the deference traditionally accorded to prison officials. Although
the Court may have rejected the hands-off doctrine as a jurisdictional bar to
prisoner complaints and may now profess that prisoners have constitutional
rights, it still refuses to interfere with prison practices even when those
practices threaten preferred constitutional rights. Regardless of the constitu-
tional right for which a prisoner seeks judicial support, the Court will con-
tinue to defer to prison officials if it adheres to the analytical method utilized
in its recent decisions. Unless the Court confronts and reassesses the wisdom
of its analysis, it will continue to permit prisoners to be treated as "really
little more than the slave described in the 19th century cases. '"160
158. Id. at 104.
159. For an expanded interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that would place re-
strictions on the discretionary authority given prison officials over prison conditions, see
Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth
Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838, 856 (1972). See also Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of
Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974); James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D.
Ala. 1974).
160. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976) (Brennan, Marshall & Stevens,
JJ., dissenting). See also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 45 U.S.L.W. 4820,
4825 (U.S. June 23, 1977) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
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